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Abstract
Employee resistance against innovations is a virulent phenomenon and
there is a broad theoretical literature on its determinants. The empiri-
cal evidence is scarce, however, and mainly provides descriptive evidence
on the incidence of the phenomenon and concentrates on the eectiveness
of change management as a measure against it. A second branch of the
empirical literature investigates the impact of unions on adoption costs and
the successful implementation of innovations. There is no representative
evidence on the impact of the economic environment on employee opposi-
tion against the implementation of an innovation in the rm independent
of managerial activities, however.
This paper uses a unique rm{level data set of a representative sample
of German service rms which includes detailed information on the eco-
nomic environment of the rm. It shows that employee opposition against
innovations can be predicted by very basic information on the rm that is
relevant for the economic situation of the employees. Employee opposition
is smaller in rms whose generic business strategy is dierentiation, while
it is larger in rms aiming at gaining competitive advantage by low costs
and prices. If the goals of the innovation is an increase in employee perfor-
mance, the rm experiences higher resistance, while resistance is lower in
rms aiming at increasing the product range by the innovation. Prot and
turn over expectations of the rm and the outside option of the employees
are negatively correlated with employee resistance. Finally, smaller rms
and rms operating in the computer and software or the technical con-
sulting sector experience lower employee resistance. Therefore, the focus
on change management measures or union activities in order to predict
employee resistance against innovations seems too narrow.
JEL-codes: J24, J53, M12, O32
Key Words: Innovation, Labour-Management Relations, Estimation
1 Introduction
Employee opposition against changes in the rm is a virulent phenomenon. It can
retard and hinder the introduction of necessary innovations and thereby reduce
the competitiveness and the long{run perspectives of the rms. In the innovation
literature the crucial aspect of worker acceptance plays a minor role, however.
Economists frequently just assume that innovation costs are mainly research and
development costs or the costs to buy patents or the right to use new processes
or ideas. The implementation of innovations in a rm after it is available for the
management is frequently seen as cost{less (see for example Ulph, 1996, page
85). An exception is the inuence activity literature that explicitly mentions re-
sistance of the workers against central managerial decisions, compare for example
Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), or Schaefer (1998). This literature
is vague about the concrete situation of innovations, however. Another strand
of the economic literature are studies about union attitudes towards innovations,
see for example Daniel (1987), Hyman and Streeck (1988), Ulph and Ulph (1988),
Machin and Wadhwani (1991), or Dowrick and Spencer (1994). This literature
concentrates on dierences between unionised and non{unionised establishments
stressing that unions may appropriate a larger share of quasi{rents than indi-
vidual workers or that unions may increase adjustment costs. The empirical
impact of unions on worker resistance is not measured directly, however, but the
estimations concentrate on the impact of unions on investment, see Machin and
Wadhwani (1991). Daniel (1987) compares the level of resistance of union oÆcers,
manual workers and shop stewards perceived by managers.
The business literature mainly concentrates on the correlation between man-
agement activities (for example employee participation in the innovation pro-
cess, information by the management or change agents) and the implementation
success, see for example Witte (1973), Maydl (1987), Bitzer and Poppe (1993),
Staehle (1994), Rosenstiel (1997), Mohr and Woehe (1998), or Hauschildt (1999).
A further important branch of literature in this context deals with the psycho-
logical sources of opposition against changes, see for example Bohnisch (1979) or
Watzka (1987).
The (scant) empirical literature on the resistance of employees against in-
novations frequently does not explain employee opposition against innovations
by the economic motives of the employees. Instead, it concentrates on descrip-
tive evidence|mostly based on case studies|about the relevance of employee
resistance against innovations, associations employees have with certain types of
innovations and the correlation of employee opposition with dierent organiza-
tional arrangements in the rm and management methods, see also the literature
surveys in Bemmels and Reshef (1991), or Hauschildt (1999).
This paper is mainly motivated by the availability of representative and de-
tailed data on worker resistance against innovations in addition to a broad variety
of general economic information about German service rms. This unique data
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set allows to test several hypotheses on the empirical determinants of employee
resistance against innovations beyond management or union activities. The paper
thereby shows that basic enterprise information like the business and innovation
strategies, the prospects of the rm and the size and sector also partly explain
employee resistance. The advantage of this approach is that it detects general
patterns of worker resistance that are independent of organizational, managerial
or personal peculiarities in a representative sample. In addition, the regression
controls for relevant variables such as the sector, the location, and the rm size
that might bias simple cross{tabulations.
In the second section, a brief survey of the empirical literature on personnel
resistance against innovations is given. The third section provides an informal
review of alternative reasons for employee resistance against innovations. The
hypotheses derived hereby are then empirically tested with estimations based on
the rm{level data of the Mannheim Innovation Panel. This is a large, repre-
sentative, and topical data set from the German service sector. The last section
concludes.
2 Empirical evidence in the Literature
There are only a few empirical studies in the business literature on the incidence
and causes of workforce resistance against innovations (see also Hauschildt, 1999).
Those studies can be divided into two main approaches: case studies and industry
studies.
1
Bitzer and Poppe (1993) questioned about 200 employees in two middle sized
enterprises in order to nd phase specic roles of promotors of innovations in
rms. They report that personnel was the main obstacle to innovation (in con-
trast to organizational, nancial or technical obstacles) while the critical phase
in the innovation process was that of accepting new ideas (in contrast to these
phases: nding ideas, realization of ideas or implementing ideas). Gierschner
(1991) interviewed 142 employees in 14 German enterprises on communication
and information during the innovation process and on the role of innovation
promotors. He nds that information plays a crucial role for the success of inno-
vations while the impact of promotors is not signicant.
On the industry level, there are also only a few studies to mention. Daniel
(1987) and Daniel and Hogarth (1990) analyse the impact of technical change
on workplace relations on the basis of an extensive survey held on the estab-
lishment level. 2019 establishments participated in the interviews from all areas
of the British economy. The authors nd that worker support for changes in
the rm strongly depends on the characteristics of the change. While changes
in work practices introduced independently of new machines provoked strong
1
The following short survey only covers the recent empirical business and economics litera-
ture on worker opposition against innovations.
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resistance, the introduction of new plants, machinery, or equipment found the
support of employees. These ndings were robust even in rms where technolog-
ical change caused reductions in the work force while organizational change did
not (see Daniel, 1987, p. 70). The explanation by Daniel and Hogarth (1990) for
this surprising result is that technological change is emotionally associated with
progress and success, while organizational change is associated with a reaction
on management failures.
Another study was performed by Bemmels and Reshef (1991). They present
answers of 206 Canadian enterprises that implemented innovations between 1980
and 1988. While on average the workers were in favour of changes, the presence
of a union and a technology clause in the labour contract increased resistance.
Changes that increased employees' skill requirements reduced resistance. Prob-
lematic is the (uncommented) result that innovations that lead to reductions in
the labour force induced less resistance than changes that increased the labour
force.
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Hauschildt (1999) presents the results of a survey with 151 German rms
that had successfully introduced an innovation. The survey concentrates on the
characteristics of opposition, especially, if constructive and destructive opposi-
tion have dierent sources and lead to dierent outcomes with respect to the
innovation success.
3 Theoretical Determinants of Employee Resis-
tance Against Innovations
The survey on the empirical literature about worker resistance against innovations
reveals that previous studies mainly concentrate on the impact of technological
changes on management{worker relations or the correlation between organiza-
tional arrangements and the success of the implementation of innovations. In
addition, these studies frequently conne themselves to reporting one{to{one
cross{tabulations. This means that they probably are prone to omitted variable
bias and spurious correlations, in other words the signicant correlations could
vanish when proper additional controls would be included.
The theoretical literature mentions a couple of relevant mechanisms that inu-
ence the strength of employee opposition against changes. Frequently, the eects
do not point in the same direction, however. In this section, the main determi-
nants identied in the literature are reviewed and hypotheses derived that serve
as a basis for the empirical validation in the next sections.
When there is opposition to innovations, it reveals conicts of motives and
is associated with conicts of distribution (see Hauschildt, 1999). A main de-
terminant mentioned in the theoretical literature is therefore the compensation
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Bemmels and Reshef (1991) use ordinary least squares which may lead to biased results
because the dependent variable is measured on an 11{point intensity scale.
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oered by the rm for the adoption costs imposed on the workers, see for example
Milgrom (1988). The smaller the compensation oered by the rm the stronger
employee resistance against innovations should be.
There are two main negative economic impacts of innovations.
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First, innovations always require training eorts and adoption costs from the
employees. These investments have three specic characteristics that induce em-
ployees to be reluctant to make them.
 First, the pay{o of the investment is risky. It is unclear, how long the
labour relation will last and therefore how long the pay{o period will be.
Employees who lose their jobs in connection with the restructuring after
the implementation of the innovation, because their skills are not needed
any longer or the work force is reduced, do not get a pay{o for their
adoption eort if they can not use the newly acquired knowledge elsewhere.
In addition, the productivity advantage after the training is not certain.
 Frequently the knowledge required by innovation is rm{specic and there-
fore useless outside the rm. According to human capital theory, the costs
for these parts should be borne by the employee. Employees frequently are
risk averse and especially young employees and employees with low quali-
cations are constrained in their liquidity, however. These factors have the
consequence that the rms have to pay for these training costs, too. Their
incentive to do so is limited, however, because they fear that the employees
could leave for a better paying rival afterwards.
 It is unclear how long the acquired knowledge is topical in the rm and
when technological progress leads to obsolescence.
Employee opposition should therefore be larger if the required new skills are very
specic, costly or topical for a short period.
The second stimulus for employee resistance is that innovations frequently
increase the pressure on employee performance and supervision possibilities. In
addition, the innovation may be labour{saving and therefore endanger employ-
ment. Employment is also at risk, if the rm substitutes some employees with
obsolete skills by better suited employees. Strong opposition against innovations
is therefore more likely, if the innovation is aiming at rationalization or the sub-
stitution of labour by capital. The same is true if the innovation tends to increase
the labour burden or demands major adoption costs from the employees.
A further element determining employee resistance is market power. The rent
from the successful implementation of the innovation has to be divided between
employer and employee. If the employer is in a strong negotiation position, the
3
In addition to \psychic" costs like uncertainty, loss of control etc. discussed in the socio{
psychological literature, see for example Bohnisch (1979))
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part of the rent attributed to the employee and therefore the incentive to invest
may be small. Unions may increase the share the employees skim from the rents
induced by the innovation and therefore decrease employee resistance, but also
the incentives of rms to innovate, see Machin and Wadhwani (1991). Therefore,
the relative bargaining power of employers and employees is important for the
strength of employee opposition.
Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) show in a theoretical model that the
prospects of layos increase the incentive of employees to exert inuence activ-
ities. This is especially observed when employees at the endangered units may
hope to divert resources from better{o departments and thereby can avoid job
losses. Therefore opposition against changes in the entire rm should increase
when the employment prospects of the rm or rm units are bleak. Schaefer
(1998) assumes that the value of employees job{related quasi rents is increasing
in inuence activity and increasing in rms prospects. Therefore a worsening
of the rms prospects reduces the available job{related quasi rents and thus
reduces incentives for inuence activity. In this model, the employees can not in-
uence the decision whether a change is introduced or not, but only the form of
change. Therefore, it seems an empirical question if stronger opposition against
changes is experienced in rms with bleak employment expectations or rms with
positive prot expectations.
Also theoretically unclear is the impact of the outside option of the employees
on employee resistance. On the one hand a low outside option could have a
disciplining eect on the employees who reduce their resistance in order to secure
the competitiveness of the rm or reduce their personal unemployment risk. On
the other hand, a low outside option may increase resistance, because employees
fear imminent labour reductions associated with innovations.
The larger the rm the more indirect are the communication channels and
garbling of information may occur. Therefore we might assume that formal resis-
tance against innovations may increase with the size of the rm, see for example
Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
The empirical evidence in this paper is based on data that do not cover all
the aspects mentioned in the theoretical literature. There is no information on
management and union activities, the impact of innovations on quasi{rents and
their distribution, compensation, or the adoption or training costs in the data.
Nevertheless, there are data on the business strategy, the innovation strategy,
the outside option of the employees and the prospects of the rm that allow the
empirical test of the following hypothesis:
1. Firms pursuing a rationalization and cost cutting strategy encounter high
employee opposition against innovations.
2. Firms pursuing an expansion of business strategy encounter low employee
opposition against innovations.
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3. Innovations that aim at increasing the performance of the employees or may
increase the unemployment hazard of the employees should encounter high
employee resistance.
4. Innovations that increase employment certainty should encounter low em-
ployee resistance.
5. Larger rms encounter higher employee resistance.
4 The Data
The estimation is based on the \Mannheim Innovation Panel in the Services
Sector" (MIP-S), a representative questionnaire lled out per wave by about 2500
(personnel) managers in German service rms with more than ve employees. A
detailed description of the data is provided in Ebling et al. (1999). There are
3 waves available now from 1995, 1997 and 1998. Unfortunately, only the 1995
wave of the MIP-S contains a question about worker resistance as a source of
innovation barriers. Therefore, a panel estimation taking account of xed and
random eects is not possible at that moment.
Innovation barriers are measured on an intensity scale from 1 (= not impor-
tant) to 5 (= very important) and several explanatory variables are also mea-
sured by intensity or a dummy variable. Therefore in the cross section regression
a multinomial ordered probit model seems to be adequate.
In 1995, 2553 managers lled in the questionnaire. Amongst them 2301 (1493
from West{Germany and 808 from East{Germany) answered on the following
question: \Please judge the importance of employee resistance against innova-
tions on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (very high importance) with respect
to the extent of the innovation activities of your enterprise in the years 1993 to
1995." Successful innovators as well as non{innovators expressed the intensity of
barriers against innovations in their rms, while managers in those rms that
did not even consider to innovate did not comment on this question. Opposition
against innovation is therefore measured in rms only that intended to introduce
an innovation or introduced an innovation. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity
between managers like risk aversion, ability to receive support for a long-run
investment project, indebtedness of the rm which might inuence manager per-
ception can not be controlled for.
Together with employee opposition, a list of other potential innovation bar-
riers was asked about. In contrast to studies for example by Bitzer and Poppe
(1993), Kirsch, Esser, and Gabele (1979) and Frohlich and Krieger (1990), but in
accordance for example with Hauschildt (1999), descriptive statistics reveal that
worker resistance is a barrier factor with relatively small importance in compar-
ison to for example innovation costs or nancing constraints. Almost half of the
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rms indicate that this barrier is not important and innovations are not accom-
panied by employee opposition. The small importance of employee resistance
as a barrier to innovation may result from the time period, the questionnaire
was lled out. Between 1993 and 1995, employment shrank and unemployment
increased in Germany.
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The employment outlook was also bleak in 1995. In ad-
dition, labour relations in the service sector were relaxed in the period between
1993 and 1995. The only major strike was in the retail trade sector leading to a
single extra premium on wages.
Nevertheless, employee resistance against innovations has enough variation in
the data to allow it to be explained by factors mentioned below. Table 1 shows
the shares of answers between 1 and 5 indicating the distribution of the relative
importance of barriers to innovations.
Table 1: Relative Importance of Barriers to Innovations (Shares and Mean)
Barriers to Innovation N 1 2 3 4 5 Mean
1: Feasibility is Risky 2308 0.268 0.239 0.276 0.140 0.077 2.521
2: Market Chances are Risky 2300 0.250 0.229 0.253 0.184 0.084 2.626
3: Costs are Risky 2310 0.212 0.229 0.266 0.214 0.079 2.720
4: Costs too High 2299 0.152 0.141 0.231 0.305 0.171 3.203
5: Amortization too Low 2303 0.177 0.171 0.264 0.251 0.137 3.002
6: Innovation Easy to Copy 2310 0.303 0.176 0.182 0.187 0.152 2.714
7: Lack of Capital 2321 0.318 0.173 0.168 0.140 0.201 3.735
8: Lack of Credit 2301 0.439 0.180 0.154 0.097 0.130 2.303
9: Lack of Specialists 2320 0.248 0.207 0.264 0.200 0.081 2.662
10: Lack of Technology 2302 0.353 0.273 0.231 0.110 0.033 2.200
11: Technology is Obsolete 2294 0.342 0.215 0.275 0.129 0.039 2.308
12: Personnel Resistance 2301 0.456 0.229 0.187 0.095 0.033 2.020
13: Red Tape 2301 0.484 0.170 0.131 0.097 0.118 2.199
14: Laws 2288 0.421 0.163 0.168 0.114 0.134 2.375
Remark: N is the number of questionnaires with valid answers on the item. The
relative importance of barriers is measured on an ordinal scale between 1 (no
importance) and 5 (very high importance).
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel for the Service Sector (MIP-S), wave 1995
Opposition to innovations may be harmful, useful or insignicant for the im-
plementation of innovations (see also the discussion in Hauschildt, 1999 ). Here,
only the harmful aspect of opposition is recorded by classifying employee op-
position as a barrier to innovation. Useful opposition that empirically matters,
because it reveals the weaknesses in the innovation project or involves practition-
ers who have an information advantage with respect to the sta in the research
and development department is not taken into account here.
Another data restriction is the aggregation level. There is only one set of
answers per rm and we therefore cannot analyse the behaviour of individual
4
Employment decreased by 1.8% in 1993, 0,7% in 1994, and 0,3% in 1995 while unemploy-
ment increased from 8,9% in 1993 to 9,4% in 1995, see for example IAB (1996).
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workers, teams or dierent departments in the rm. In addition, we have to
rely on the worker resistance level the manager who is lling out the form is
experiencing. This perception may vary over the rm's hierarchy (with higher
levels perceiving less worker resistance)
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and from innovation to innovation. On
the other hand, studying managers perception of worker resistance is important,
because it is them who decide whether or not to introduce the innovation, see
Bemmels and Reshef (1991).
5 The Evidence
The factors that explain employee opposition in the data set can be divided into
four categories. The rst category is the business strategy of the rm. The busi-
ness strategy is covered in the survey by a 16 item list. Several of the answers
on the list are highly correlated and therefore the proper approach to include
business strategies is by a factor or principal components analysis. The purpose
of a factor analysis is to identify a limited range of underlying unobserved com-
ponents which capture a large proportion of the many observed variables. Here,
the choice of factors has to be guided both by the data and by theoretical sense,
that is, the interpretability of the factor. The factor analysis reduces the list of
16 items to 7 principal factors with loadings above zero (which is the threshold
usually applied for factors). These factors can be interpreted by the items with
the highest loadings, compare also the pattern list in Table 4 in the appendix.
We nd the following generic business strategies:
 Novelty of product, production and organization,
 Cost reduction by outsourcing,
 Low prices and input costs,
 EÆciency in using infrastructure and services,
 Broad variety of products and services,
 Flexibility in client service,
 High reputation and product quality.
The business strategies mentioned in the questionnaire are broadly in accordance
with the generic competitive strategies, Porter (1985) denes as suitable for estab-
lishing a protable and sustainable position against competitors. Porter (1985)
mentions two basic types of competitive advantage: low cost or dierentiation.
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A dummy on the position and function of the person who answered the questionnaire proved
to be insignicant, however.
8
Cost Leadership can be achieved by cost reduction, by exibility and innovation,
outsourcing or eÆciency in using infrastructure and services. The cost leadership
may induce low prices. Dierentiation on the other hand may take the form of
exibility in the client service, a broad variety of products and services and a
high reputation in product quality. The only strategy that does not t into both
categories is the rst one where the rm seeks competitiveness by being at the
leading edge in innovations. This strategy consists of the four factors \Novelty
of products and services, improvement in client advice and service, cost optimiz-
ing by implementing new technologies, and costs optimizing by re{organization".
The last three factors should increase employee resistance because they may lead
to rationalization and a higher employee performance demand while the last fac-
tor could increase sales and thereby employment security of the employees. The
sign of the factor therefore depends on the weights of the individual elements.
If the employees behave according to the hypotheses formulated above, the
rm should experience higher worker resistance if the business strategy of the
rm implies higher job loss hazards for the employees, higher training costs or
demands on employee performance. This is especially the case if the competitive
strategy of the rm is cost leadership (Cost reduction by outsourcing, low prices
and input costs, and eÆciency in using infrastructure and services), because
this strategy implies rationalization, intense supervision of labour and tight cost
control, see for example Porter (1980).
If the competitive strategy of the rm is to be unique in its industry along
some dimensions that are widely valued by buyers, jobs should not be endangered
by innovations, the rm oers amenities to attract highly skilled labour and
has a creative air, see Porter (1980). Therefore employee resistance should
be negatively correlated with these business strategies (Broad variety of products
and services, exibility in client service, and high reputation and product quality).
The second set of explanatory variables concerns the goals of innovations.
Again, this was asked on a 16 item list. The factor analysis produces 6 principal
factors with loadings above zero. The factors with the highest loadings lead to
the following interpretation of the principal goals of innovations (see Table 5):
 Improve service availability,
 Higher productivity,
 Better employee performance,
 Better product performance during usage,
 Replacement of traditional services,
 Better client friendliness, exibility and satisfaction.
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The rst innovation goals aim at increasing the eÆciency in production and
therefore put pressure on employee performance. Replacement of traditional
services demands adoption eorts while it does not increase employment certainty
of the employees in the short run. These goals associated with the innovations
should therefore increase employee resistance. It is interesting to note that the
goal to \increase the motivation of the employees" is highly correlated with the
factor \increase in the performance of the employees" and therefore forms one
component. The sign of this component therefore depends on the pervasiveness
of the two factors.
Better client friendliness, exibility and satisfaction promises higher employ-
ment security when indeed market shares can be secured or increased by this
innovation. Nevertheless also demands on employee performance for example in
the service sections could increase. Therefore the net eect is unclear in this case.
The third set of economic variables concerns the future prospects of the rm
and the outside option of the employees.
 Unemployment rate in the German state (\Land") the rm is located in,
 Revenues are expected to increase,
 Turn over is expected to increase.
The outside option of the employees is instrumented by the unemployment rate
in the region of the rm. It is costly to move from one state to another in
order to nd a new job (especially in Germany with its low labour mobility).
Therefore, the local unemployment rate gives a good indication of the specic
average unemployment hazard of the employees. The unemployment rate in the
German states in 1995 has been merged from the oÆcial unemployment statistics.
The sign of these impacts can not be predicted by the theory.
It can be assumed that employee resistance is more likely in larger rms,
because supervision seems more diÆcult and the contact and information between
managers and workers is more indirect. Hauschildt (1999) interprets rm size as
a proxy for the system complexity and nds a positive correlation between the
size of the organization and constructive opposition. The set of control variables
are the sector and the location of the rm in East- or West{Germany and the size
of the rm. These are the usual control variables, because employee resistance
can be expected to dier in these categories. A detailed list of the explanatory
variables is provided in Table 3.
The evidence is collected in Table 2. The low costs business strategy has
the expected positive sign, while the dierentiation strategy leads to lower em-
ployee opposition. A pure innovation strategy leads to higher employee resistance
against innovations. Therefore the increase in employment performance demand
and rationalization outweigh the increase in employment security in rms pursu-
ing this business strategy.
10
Table 2: Results of Ordered Probit Estimation Explaining Personnel Resistance
Against Innovations
Independent variables coeÆcients |z|
Business strategies
Novelty of product, production and organization .085
*
1.901
Cost reduction by outsourcing .238
***
5.745
Low prices and input costs .064 .943
EÆciency in using infrastructure and services .218
**
2.135
Flexibility in client service -.090
*
-1.665
Broad variety of products and services -.103
*
-1.852
High reputation and product quality -.338
**
-2.263
Innovation goals
Improve service availability .018 0.466
Higher productivity .047 1.135
Better employee performance .102
**
2.328
Better product performance during usage .065 1.290
Better client friendliness, exibility and satisfaction -.095 -1.509
Replacement of traditional services .181
**
2.239
Turn over is expected to rise -.061 -.944
Revenues are expected to rise -.021 -.313
Unemployment rate in state where rm is located -.007 -.470
Large rm .288
***
4.440
Firm located in East-Germany -.412
***
-3.723
Wholesale trade -.071 -.721
Retail trade -.082 -.730
Transport and telecommunications -.134 -1.267
Banking and insurance .042 .447
Computer and software -.314
**
-2.405
Technical Consulting -.261
**
-2.148
Number of observations 1405
Log likelihood -1820
Remark: The signicance levels are marked by stars:*** means signicance lower
than one percent, ** lower than ve percent and * lower than ten percent.
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel for the Service Sector (MIP-S), wave 1995.
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The innovation goals \better employee performance" and \replacement of
traditional services" induce higher employee resistance as expected from the hy-
pothesis.
The sign of the prospects of turn over and prots as well as the outside option
was theoretically unclear and the estimation indicates a negative, but insignicant
impact.
We observe signicantly lower employee resistance in Eastern Germany. Lower
worker resistance may be a consequence of a better workforce{management re-
lation in the mainly newly founded and small rms in the East or a stronger
consciousness about the necessity of change in order to stay or become com-
petitive. As we also control for regional unemployment rates in the regression,
the dierence in the outside option in both parts of the country can not be the
explaining factor here.
We also allow for sectoral eects by including seven sector dummies for dier-
ent service branches. Electronic data processing rms encounter signicantly less
worker resistance than other rms. This may be a consequence of the fact that
the electronic data processing branch is notorious for its innovation dynamics.
Therefore employees should only choose an employer in electronic data process-
ing when they do not consider permanent adoption costs, changes, and the risk to
lose the job as a major problem. Larger rms experience more resistance against
changes in our data set. This is in line with other empirical investigations, see
for example Daniel (1987). Therefore, the more formal communication channels
in larger rms induce higher resistance.
In a further illustrative regression (not reported here) it is shown that the
parameters have the same sign and about the same signicance level, if the sample
is restricted to rms having introduced a process innovation or to rms having
introduced a product innovation. The same applies to the parameter indicating
the share of innovation expenditures on total revenues and the share of innovation
expenditures on investments. These insignicant variables are excluded from the
reported regression accordingly, because about 600 rms did not answer at least
one of the questions and therefore the number of observations would be reduced
signicantly.
Resistance of employees against innovations is not the only barrier to innova-
tions asked for in the questionnaire, but there is a list of fourteen items (compare
table 4). Therefore it is possible that the managers who answered the question-
naire marked the intensity scale in a similar fashion, in other words there may be
multicollinearity between the barrier factors. If this would be the case, the an-
swers to employee resistance would represent a mixture of all barriers to entry and
give the general impression of how diÆcult it is to implement an innovation in the
particular rm and not in particular how intense is employee resistance against
innovations. A principal components analysis shows that the item \personnel
resistance" has the highest uniqueness in the list after the factor \innovation is
easy to copy" (6). The factor loadings indicate that accordingly \personnel re-
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sistance" and \innovation is easy to copy" are each a factor of their own. Other
items on the list may be combined to one factor instead. The factor loadings
are displayed in Table 6. These are the factors identied: Risks and costs of the
innovation (1-5), personnel resistance (12), bureaucratic barriers (13, 14), lack of
capital and technology (7-10), riskiness of the innovation (1,2), and innovation is
easy to copy (6). We can therefore conclude that employee resistance is unique
enough and suÆciently dierent from other barriers against innovations that the
measurement of it does not pick up other factors.
This conclusion is also conrmed in an additional estimation that includes the
intensity answers to the other six independent barriers to entry. The endogeneous
variable employee resistance is \corrected" by the dierence to the mean of the
intensities of all innovation barrier variables. The new endogeneous variable
therefore is high if employee resistance is high in comparison to all other barrier
factors. Performing this transformation, a large number of intensity indicators
between 0.2 and 5 are obtained. In order to estimate the impact of the exogeneous
factors on the transformed indicator of personnel resistance by ordered probit
again, the intensities are grouped to ve
6
again with roughly the same share
of rms in each group. The estimation results are reported in table 7 in the
appendix. Table 7 reveals that all signicant explanatory variables keep their
signs while some variables increase their signicance levels and some decrease
it, see Table 2. The business strategies \low prices" and the innovation goals
\improve product by better labour organization and higher productivity" turn
signs and are negative now. Finally, the insignicant correlations with the turn
over and revenue expectations, and the outside option of the employees reverse
signs while they are still insignicant.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that basic information on the business environment of the rm
partly explains personnel resistance against innovations. In a micro{econometric
analysis, representative evidence is given that employees do not oppose inno-
vations per se, but they try to prevent the implementation of innovations that
endanger their jobs, increase their labour burden and cause large adoption costs.
Opposition against innovations depends on the business strategy, the innovation
goals, the outside option of the employees, and the prospects of the rm. Worker
resistance is higher in rms pursuing cost leadership or innovativeness as their
competitive strategy, while it is lower in rms concentrating on dierentiation.
Firms implementing innovations in order to increase employee performance or
substitute traditional products encounter higher opposition than rms who want
to increase client satisfaction by the innovation. When the rm expects a posi-
tive development of revenues and turn over and therefore the pay{o of adoption
6
The number of groups does not have an impact on the results.
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costs is more likely, employee resistance is lower. A lower outside option of the
rm has a disciplinary impact on worker opposition. Findings in the literature
that larger rms encounter higher employee resistance are conrmed. Finally,
this study shows that rms in the computer and software business experience
signicantly lower resistance than service rms in other sectors.
We can therefore conclude that the focus in the innovation literature on man-
agement strategies, union activities, and institutional factors is too narrow. Also
the business strategy of the rm, the innovation goals, the size and the sector of
the rm have explanatory value for the prediction if innovations can be imple-
mented successfully.
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7 Appendix
The endogeneous variable is personnel resistance. The means and the number of
answers (N) of the exogeneous variables included in the ordered probit regressions
are given in table 3 below.
Table 3: Data description of exogeneous variables
Denition of dummy-variable Mean N
Large rm (more than 100 employees) .329 2552
Turn over is expected to increase .553 2507
Location of the rm in East-Germany .362 2552
Revenues are expecting to increase .577 2468
Unemployment rate in state (no dummy) 11.79 2543
Wholesale trade .151 2552
Retail trade .121 2552
Transport and telecommunications .144 2552
Banking and insurance .152 2552
Computer and software .058 2552
Technical Consulting .083 2552
Other community services (reference sector) .291 2552
Number of questionnaires including all variables (net sample) 1405
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel for the Service Sector (MIP-S), wave 1995.
The following tables 4 to 6 show the factor loadings for the item lists of business
strategies, innovation goals, and barriers to innovations.
Table 7 presents the result for the ordered probit estimation of personnel
resistance when the intensity of personnel resistance is divided by the average
intensity of all barriers to entry.
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Table 4: Pattern matrix of factor analysis: Business strategies
Success Factors Novelty
of prod-
uct,
produc-
tion and
organi-
zation
Cost re-
duction
by out-
sourcing
Flexibility
in client
service
Broad
variety
of pro-
ducts
and
services
Low
prices
and
input
costs
EÆciency
in using
infras-
tructure
and
services
High
reputa-
tion and
product
quality
Low prices 0.25
High quality 0.06
Flexibility in
the reaction to
client demands
0.25
Delivery on time 0.27
Improvement
in client advice
and service
0.55
Marketing and
reputation
0.12
Broad product
range
0.23
Various distri-
bution channels
0.29
Novelty of
products and
services
0.60
Cost optimizing
by: outsourcing
0.47
... outsourcing
to foreign sites
0.46
... outsourcing
to new sites
0.41
... implement-
ing new tech-
nologies
0.56
... re{
organization
0.57
... eÆcient use
of infrastructure
0.14
... reducing en-
ergy and mate-
rial costs
0.32
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Table 5: Pattern matrix of factor analysis: Innovation goals
Innovation expendi-
tures are targeted
on:
Improve
service
availabil-
ity
Higher
produc-
tivity
Better
employee
perfor-
mance
Better
product
perfor-
mance
during
usage
Better
client
friend-
liness,
exibil-
ity and
satisfac-
tion
Replace-
ment of
tradi-
tional
services
Increase in: client
exibility
0.19
... client friendliness 0.25
... reliability 0.62
... temporal avail-
ability of services
0.58
... spatial availabil-
ity of services
0.55
... speed of produc-
tion/delivery
0.53
... safety standards 0.31
... ecological, med-
ical and ergonomic
standards
0.33
... client perfor-
mance and competi-
tiveness
0.54 0.39
... client satisfaction 0.11
... productivity 0.39
Improvement
in maintenance
longevity, and recy-
cling of product
0.13
Increase in motiva-
tion of employees
0.39
Increase in produc-
tivity of employees
0.38
Replacement of tra-
ditional services
0.19
Expansion of busi-
ness areas
0.13
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Table 6: Pattern matrix of factor analysis: Barriers against innovations
Barriers Risks and
costs of
innova-
tion
Personnel
resistance
Bureau-
cratic
barriers
Lack of
capital
and tech-
nology
Riskiness
of inno-
vation
Innovation
is easy to
copy
Feasibility is risky 0.25
Market chances
are risky
0.28
Costs are risky 0.70
Costs too high 0.73
Amortization too
low
0.69
Innovation easy to
copy
0.22
Lack of capital 0.28
Lack of credit 0.31
Lack of specialists 0.28
Lack of Technol-
ogy
0.37
Technology is Ob-
solete
Personnel Resis-
tance
0.38
Red Tape 0.55
Laws 0.54
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Table 7: Results of Ordered Probit Regression Explaining Personnel Resistance
Against Innovations, Modied Endogeneous Variable
Independent variables coeÆcients |z|
Business strategies
Novelty of product, production and organization 0.004 .100
Cost reduction by outsourcing 0.081
**
2.017
Low prices and input costs -0.115
*
-1.759
EÆciency in using infrastructure and services 0.247
**
2.475
Flexibility in client service -0.096
*
-1.807
Broad variety of products and services -0.080 -1.483
High reputation and product quality -0.295
**
-2.035
Innovation goals
Improve service availability -0.127
***
-3.378
Higher productivity -0.038 -.954
Better employee performance 0.035 0.816
Better product performance during usage 0.035 0.816
Better client friendliness, exibility, and satisfaction -0.086 -1.407
Replacement of traditional services 0.101 1.288
Turn over is expected to rise 0.096 1.513
Revenues are expected to rise 0.000 0.010
Unemployment rate in state where rm is located 0.009 0.602
Large rm 0.386
***
5.951
Firm located in East-Germany -0.427
***
-3.945
Wholesale trade -0.029 -0.296
Retail trade -0.004 0.033
Transport and telecommunications -0.116 -1.123
Banking and insurance 0.131 1.418
Computer and software -0.507
***
-4.02
Technical Consulting -0.420
***
-3.658
Number of observations 1355
Log likelihood -2052
Remark: The signicance levels are marked by stars:*** means signicance lower
than one percent, ** lower than ve percent and * lower than ten percent.
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel for the Service Sector (MIP-S), wave 1995.
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